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INTRODUCTION
At All Saints Episcopal Church in California, two days before the
2004 presidential election, its former pastor imagined a debate
between Jesus and the presidential candidates. The pastor began by
assuring his listeners, “I don't intend to tell you how to vote.”1 He
† John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I thank
Lloyd Mayer for comments on an earlier draft and Erin Massey for excellent research
assistance. I also thank the Case Western Reserve Law Review for giving me this opportunity to
write in memory of Laura Chisolm, from whose thinking, whether in publications or at
meetings, I always learned so much.
1
George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, All Saints Church, If Jesus Debated Senator Kerry
and President Bush 1 (October 31, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.allsaintspas.org/pdf/(10-31-04)%20If%20Jesus%20Debated.pdf). The sermon criticized Senator Kerry
by name as well, but not to the extent that it took President Bush to task. See id. at 1–5
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went on, in the voice of Jesus, to criticize the Iraq war into which
“President Bush ha[d] led us,” and wondered whether President Bush
really meant “to end a decade-old ban on developing nuclear
battlefield weapons,”2 as well as to ask why so little was mentioned
about the poor.3 Finally, he asserted in his own voice, that the number
of abortions had risen under George W. Bush because women having
abortions could not afford to have a child.4 The pastor concluded,
“When you go into the voting booth on Tuesday, take with you all
that you know about Jesus, the peacemaker. Take all that Jesus means
to you. Then vote your deepest values.”5
A few months earlier, on July 11, 2004, Julian Bond spoke at the
2004 NAACP Convention. His lengthy speech reviewed the civil
rights records of presidents of both parties, but especially criticized
the Republican Party, its tax policy, civil rights policy, the war in
Iraq, and other foreign and domestic policy issues.6 Bond continued:
The election this fall is a contest between two widely
disparate views of who we are and what we believe. One
view wants to march us backward through history—
surrendering control of government to special interests,
weakening democracy, giving religion veto power over
science, curtailing civil liberties, despoiling the
environment . . . . The other view promises expanded
democracy and giving the people, not plutocrats, control over
their government.7
The speech included statistics about African American voter
registration drives and voting records.8 It also urged the audience to
vote in the upcoming election.9

(referencing President Bush twenty times and Senator Kerry only twelve times).
2 Id. at 2.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 4–5.
5 Id. at 6.
6 See Julian Bond, Chairman of the NAACP Bd. of Dirs., 2004 NAACP Convention
Speech
11–13,
18–23
(July
11,
2004)
(transcript
available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/church/naacp-speech.pdf) (criticizing Republicans’
track record with school desegregation, referring to the war in Iraq as “a war without reason or
necessity,” stating that Republicans “preach racial neutrality and practice racial division,” and
blaming the deficit at that time “squarely on the tax giveaways to the rich”).
7 Id. at 23.
8 See id. at 24–27 (discussing the NAACP and NAACP National Voter Fund registration
statistics and stating “if whites and non-whites vote in the same percentages as they did in 2000,
Bush will be re-defeated by 3 million votes”).
9 See id. at 27 (“Our response must be determination—to flood the polls and cast our
votes in such large numbers that there will be no doubt. That’s letting the good guys win.”).
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As a result of these communications, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS” or “Service”) investigated both of these organizations,10 which
are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), because such entities cannot,
without risking the loss of their exemption, “participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.”11 That is, they are subject to a campaign
intervention prohibition. Such organizations, commonly referred to as
charities, cannot endorse or oppose a candidate for public office or
contribute to a candidate’s campaign. The IRS has long interpreted
this campaign intervention prohibition broadly. An applicable
regulation, for example, refers to violating the prohibition “directly or
indirectly.”12
Revenue Ruling 2007–41, the most recent and comprehensive
official IRS pronouncement on the subject, explains that “[w]hether
an organization is participating or intervening, directly or indirectly,
in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office depends upon all of the facts and
circumstances of each case.”13 Applying the facts-and-circumstances
test, the IRS determined that All Saints Episcopal Church had

See sources cited infra note 14 (discussing the results of the investigations).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, unless otherwise specified.
12 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2008) (“[a]n organization is
an action organization” not eligible for section 501(c)(3) status if it violates the campaign
intervention prohibition “directly or indirectly”).
13 Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–25 I.R.B. 1421. Issuance of the Revenue Ruling followed the
issuance of an I.R.S. fact sheet. This fact sheet included similar but not identical examples of
what constitutes prohibited activity, but which did not represent official guidance or advice of
the National IRS office and thus was not a document on which taxpayers could rely as authority.
See
I.R.S.
News
Release
FS–2006–17
(Feb.
2006),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154712,00.html (providing examples to highlight
circumstances that would constitute “campaign intervention”); Fred Stokeld, IRS Publishes
Guidance on Charities and Politics as Election Year Looms, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 8, 2007,
available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 111–4 (comments of exempt organization specialists comparing
fact sheet to revenue ruling); see also Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(1) (as amended in 1987) (stating
that “[t]he Internal Revenue Bulletin is the authoritative instrument of the Commissioner”);
Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 243, 249, (discussing revenue rulings and notices, and their degrees of
relative
authority);
Tax
Code,
Regulations
and
Official
Guidance,
IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last updated Sept. 29, 2010) (operating
as an online search mechanism for the Internal Revenue Bulletin); Understanding IRS
Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101102,00.html (last
updated May 20, 2011) (stating that “[a] revenue ruling is an official interpretation by the IRS of
the Internal Revenue Code, related statutes, tax treaties and regulations” and “the conclusion of
the IRS on how the law is applied to a specific set of facts,” while “[a] notice is a public
pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves substantive interpretations of the
Internal Revenue Code or other provisions of the law”).
10
11
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violated the campaign intervention prohibition, but that the NAACP
had not.14
How the IRS interprets, communicates, and enforces the campaign
intervention prohibition, particularly indirect intervention, has been,
and continues to be, a matter of controversy. Representatives from the
charitable community, both before and after the publication of
Revenue Ruling 2007–41, have sought greater clarity regarding the
criteria for campaign intervention. Several commentators have
suggested that current rules may be unconstitutionally vague and that,
to avoid this problem, violation of the campaign intervention
prohibition be limited to activities involving express advocacy.15 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,16 which excoriated the Federal Election Commission as
a “censor” that, by embracing “the open-ended rough-and-tumble of
factors,” had chilled political speech of “primary importance” to the
“integrity of the electoral process,” has given renewed urgency to this
plea.17
These different attitudes of the charitable community and the IRS
reflect the difference between rules and standards. Louis Kaplow
explains in an influential article, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, that the choice between rules and standards
involves “the extent to which a given aspect of a legal command
should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement authority to
14 The IRS, however, did no more than send the church a letter of warning. See Fred
Stokeld, IRS Ends Probe of California Church; Church Wants Answers, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Sept. 25, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 186–2 (describing the letter of warning from the
IRS); Fred Stokeld, IRS Probe of NAACP Ends; Civil Rights Group Keeps Exemption, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 1, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 170–1 (stating “the IRS concluded
that the NAACP did not engage in political campaign intervention”). The factors that may have
led to these differing results include the timing of each talk, the broad ranging content of the
NAACP speech itself, which took a broad historical view of civil rights issues, and the
organization’s history of addressing such issues. See sources cited infra note 56 (listing factors
the IRS looks at in distinguishing issue advocacy from campaign intervention); see also
Inconsistent Enforcement: IRS Findings in NAACP and All Saints Church Cases, OMB WATCH
(Feb. 14 2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3608 (making a comparison of the two
speeches).
15 See, e.g., Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in
Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142, 170 (2007) (advocating
“[d]evelopment of bright-line rules that clearly define permissible activity”); Elizabeth J.
Kingsley, Bright Lines? Safe Harbors?, TAX’N OF EXEMPTS, Jul.–Aug. 2008, at 38, 43
(discussing “discontent with the vagueness” and that “the conversation around a possible brightline standard is starting to crystallize”); James Bopp, Jr. & Zachary S. Kester, Holding the
Service’s Feet to the Fire: Applying Citizens United and the First Amendment to the IRC §
501(c)(3) Political Prohibition, ENGAGE, Dec. 2010, at 75, 77 , http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20101223_BoppKesterEngage11.3.pdf (“The only solution to the vagueness
problem is a clear, bright-line, speech-protective test such as the express advocacy test.”).
16 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
17 Id. at 895–96 (quotations and citation omitted).
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consider.”18 By asking the IRS for clarity and bright-line rules to
define the prohibition, the charitable community emphasizes a key ex
ante consideration—the impact of guidance on appropriate charitable
behavior. By offering a multifactor approach dependent on the
particular situation, the IRS stresses an equally important ex post
consideration—the impact of guidance on enforcement.
Both considerations, of course, have a place in any calculus.
Kaplow’s article, however, sets out a framework to help those that
must give content to legal commands and guidance to decide whether
to frame such content as rules or standards. This Article argues that,
under Kaplow’s analysis, the IRS’s own concern for encouraging
compliance should lead it to develop more rules in this area. That is,
this Article emphasizes why the IRS itself should want to promulgate
rules.
Part I sets forth Kaplow’s analytical framework regarding levels of
enforcement and how the affected community will choose to learn
about the legal command, whether it is a rule or standard. Part II
describes the legal commands at issue. Part III considers aspects of
Kaplow’s analysis related to enforcement. It examines the available
sanctions, the numbers of parties subject to enforcement actions, and
the kinds of sanctions in fact imposed. Part IV discusses the nature of
the affected community and how members of that community will
seek legal advice. Part V addresses a question Kaplow mentions
frequently, but only in passing: what are the underlying norms a
statutory command reflects? This Part discusses both the legislative
purpose in enacting the prohibition and attitudes toward its
constitutionality. Part VI considers arguments against rules, both
generally and as applied to tax law. Part VII applies the Kaplow
analysis to all these considerations and concludes that the IRS should
invest the time to develop a set of rules.
I. KAPLOW ON RULES AND STANDARDS
According to Kaplow, in implementing a legal command, a legal
authority must begin by choosing, at least to some extent, between a
rule and a standard.19 That is, legal authorities must decide whether to
issue a specific command ex ante or to wait and give the command
detailed content only ex post in an enforcement action. That decision,
however, is only the first of three stages that take place
18 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562
(1992). I will rely primarily on Kaplow’s analysis in this piece, but at various places will also
consider other contributions to the vast academic literature on rules versus standards.
19 Id. at 568.
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chronologically. In stage two, individuals must decide to act. In stage
three, some kind of enforcement action determines the application of
the governing law.20
Kaplow’s article focused on situations in which legislatures
promulgate legal commands and courts enforce them.21 His analysis,
however, applies in particularly interesting ways to an administrative
agency such as the IRS,22 which has a duty to ensure that the tax laws
are obeyed, but must also consider how best to deploy its limited
resources. The IRS is, of course, constrained both by the provisions
that Congress enacts in the Internal Revenue Code and decisions that
courts issue. But it also has the capacity to interpret congressional
commands through various forms of administrative guidance (some
of which are promulgated jointly with the Treasury Department) and
to enforce them in audits and other enforcement actions.
In Kaplow’s analysis, legal authorities weighing the costs of
promulgation and the costs of enforcement should not make a
decision at stage one without carefully considering stages two and
three. Cost of promulgation is important. “Rules are more costly to
promulgate than standards because rules involve advance
determinations of the law’s content . . . .”23 Nonetheless, “[i]f there
will be many enforcement actions, the added cost from having
resolved the issue on a wholesale basis at the promulgation stage will
be outweighed by the benefit of having avoided additional costs
repeatedly incurred in giving content to a standard on a retail basis.”24
Moreover, a rule may be preferable when the legal command governs
“millions of individuals and billions of transactions,”25 such as in the
federal income tax, even if enforcement actions are rare. In contrast,
if the relevant facts vary widely, “[d]esigning a rule that accounts for
every relevant contingency would be wasteful, as most would never
arise.”26 Standards are better suited for situations in which a particular
set of facts will occur only rarely.
Legal authorities also need to bear in mind, however, the impact of
their choice on the behavior of those whom their command affects; in
other words, they must consider stage two. “Being imperfectly
Id. at 562.
See, e.g., id. at 583 (noting that a standard could reflect the “legislature’s decision to
delegate the question to the courts”).
22 In any case involving promulgation of regulations, the Treasury Department will be
involved as well as the IRS. See Hickman, supra note 13, at 240 n.4 (citing authorities that
describe the promulgation of regulations).
23 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 562.
24 Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 564 (referring specifically to tax as an example).
26 Id. at 563.
20
21
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informed of the law’s commands,” affected parties may “act based on
their best guess of the law,” or they may seek to acquire legal
information.27 They may acquire such legal knowledge by seeking
professional legal advice, through study of government resources,
through information disseminated by trade groups, other third-party
resources, or by other means. On the basis of this legal information,
they may decide to avoid conduct that they learn is illegal or subject
to sanctions to which they do not wish to become subject.28 Legal
knowledge may also lead them to engage in conduct that they had
mistakenly thought was forbidden or subject to sanctions they thought
severe but are in fact quite minor.29
Affected parties, however, must decide how much to invest in
learning about the content of a legal command. The value of
obtaining information about the law depends on the value that parties
place on conduct from which they are deterred, and the value they
place on conduct that they feel free to undertake after investigation. 30
Importantly, to Kaplow, the decision by an affected party about how
much to invest in learning about the content of a legal command is
likely to differ depending on whether the content is a rule or a
standard. “Because a standard requires a prediction of how an
enforcement authority will decide questions that are already answered
in the case of a rule, advice about a standard is more costly.”31 As a
result, affected parties may well choose not to become as well
informed regarding standards. Thus, a rule could improve
compliance. “[S]ubstantial compliance with imperfect rules” may
yield better results than “poor compliance with more nearly perfect
standards.”32 Frequency is again important. “[T]he number of
individuals who incur the cost of legal advice may greatly exceed the
number who are subject to complete enforcement proceedings.”33
Thus, Kaplow suggests that, while standards have an important role to
play in ensuring accurate enforcement actions, rules offer two
possible sources of benefits: (1) individuals may need to spend less
time learning their content; and (2) they “may become better

Id. at 562.
See id. at 571 (“[I]nformed individuals might be deterred from conduct they would have
taken if they had remained uninformed.”).
29 See id. (“[I]nformed individuals might choose to undertake acts they would have been
deterred from committing if they had remained uninformed.”).
30 See id. (“The value of advice, then, is simply the value of each possibility weighted by
the likelihood of its occurrence.”).
31 Id. at 569 (footnote omitted).
32 Id. at 608 n.138.
33 Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
27
28
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informed about rules than standards and thus better conform their
behavior to the law.”34
Kaplow’s framework helps to clarify the different preferences of
the IRS and the charitable community in addressing the campaign
intervention prohibition. It directs us to ask a number of questions
about enforcement, such as, the available sanctions, the number of
parties subject to enforcement actions, and the kinds of sanctions in
fact imposed. But it also charges us to consider the number and nature
of parties subject to the legal command, whether they are likely to
seek legal advice, and the nature of legal advice they are likely to
consult. Underlying all of Kaplow’s analysis is a concern that a legal
command conform to its underlying norms. He also gives significant
attention to issues of complexity. All of these factors bear upon
whether a rule or a standard is most likely to achieve the highest
possible level of compliance.
II. THE LEGAL COMMANDS AT ISSUE
First, it is important to note that Congress issued the legal
commands regarding the political campaign prohibition. Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that an organization
cannot be tax-exempt if it “participate[s] in, or intervene[s] in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.”35 The provision was first introduced as part of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code.36 Congress amended the provision in 1987 to
prohibit opposing as well as supporting any candidate.37
Id. at 577.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
36 See Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United:
A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV 685, 686 (2012) (stating the “political
activities prohibition” was introduced in the Internal Revenue Code in 1954). I note that the
staff of Senator Grassley, former ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Committee,
recently recommended that the campaign intervention prohibition be eliminated or
circumscribed. See Memorandum from Theresa Pattara & Sean Barnett on Review of MediaBased Ministries to Senator Grassley 54 (Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Senate Staff Memorandum],
available at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=5fa343ed-87eb-49b082b9-28a9502910f7 (stating that “[t]he electioneering prohibition on Section 501(c)(3)
organizations should be repealed or circumscribed”). Grassley, however, did not endorse any of
the recommendations in the staff report. Instead, he referred the issues to a commission to be
headed by the Evangelical Council of Financial Accountability. See Letter from Charles E.
Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Dan Busby, President, Evangelical Council for Financial
Accountability
(Jan.
5,
2011),
http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=5fa343ed-87eb-49b0-82b928a9502910f7 (requesting the Evangelical Council of Financial Accountability consider and
provide input on the issues addressed in the staff report).
I will address a number of issues raised by the staff report later in this piece. Generally,
however, I observe that this staff recommendation flies in the face of the long history of the
34
35
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In general and subject to various limits, contributions to section
501(c)(3) organizations are tax-deductible for purposes of the federal
income tax. Section 170(c)(2)(D), a provision dating to 1969 that
codified a Treasury regulation,38 provides specifications regarding the
tax-deductibility of charitable contributions.39 A contribution or gift
must, among other requirements, be to or for the use of an entity
“which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”40
In 1987, Congress gave the IRS some additional tools to enforce
the campaign intervention prohibition. It provided that any
organization losing its exempt status under section 501(c)(3) because
of substantial lobbying or violating the campaign intervention
prohibition cannot at any time thereafter be treated as a section
501(c)(4) organization.41 Congress also enacted section 4955, an
excise tax on violations of the prohibition.42 Under this provision, a
two-tier excise tax applies to amounts paid or incurred for campaign
intervention.43 The initial section 4955 excise tax on the organization
is 10 percent of each forbidden campaign intervention expenditure,
with a separate tax of 2.5 percent on a knowing organization manager
(up to $5,000) in certain circumstances.44 If the organization does not

prohibition. See Colinvaux, supra note 36, at 690–97 (discussing the historical background of
the prohibition). It also fails to consider that we as a nation have a policy of requiring all
contributions for political campaigns to come from after-tax income, other policy reasons that
favor the prohibition, or the abuses that could follow repeal of the prohibition. See Ellen P.
Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations after Citizens
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011) (arguing for changes in the laws regarding political
activities); Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2007) (discussing tax and electioneering issues related to
501(c)(3) organizations); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:
Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1363 (2007)
(concluding that the section 501(c)(3) prohibition ensures “taxpayer subsidies are not used for
political campaigns” and “protects democracy by keeping all groups on a level playing field”).
37 Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–203, § 10711(a)(2), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330–464
(1987).
38 See Colinvaux, supra note 36, at 697.
39 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(d) (2006).
40 Id. The gift and estate taxes also provide for a charitable contribution deduction,
although the wording is not identical to section 170(c)(2)(d). See I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) (providing
a charitable contribution deduction in the context of estate taxes, but not for contributions to
organizations disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) for political activities);
I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (providing a charitable contribution deduction, in the context of gift taxes,
but not for contributions to organizations disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3)
for political activities).
41 I.R.C. § 504(a).
42 I.R.C. § 4955.
43 Id. at (a)–(b).
44 Id. at (a), (c).
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recover part or all of the expenditures to the extent possible and
establish safeguards to prevent future campaign intervention,45 the
IRS levies a second tier of taxes of 100 percent on the organization
and 50 percent (up to $10,000) on the knowing manager.46 If the
correction is accomplished and the expenditure was not “willful and
flagrant,” the IRS can waive the first-tier tax.47
According to the legislative history of the provision, the section
4955 excise tax was enacted to be imposed, in most cases, in addition
to, and not in lieu of, revocation.48 If the political campaign
intervention involves little out of pocket expense, the excise tax has
little bite. When a violation of the campaign intervention prohibition
is flagrant, however, the IRS can make an immediate termination
assessment of tax due.49 The IRS can also file an action in federal
district court to halt or enjoin future campaign intervention if certain
procedural requirements are met.50
Regulations, the most authoritative form of administrative
guidance,51 provide some additional interpretation regarding the
congressional commands, but do not set out any bright-line rules. The
regulations under section 501(c)(3) explain that an organization
cannot be exempt under that provision if it is an “action”
organization, which includes an organization that violates the
campaign intervention prohibition.52 The regulations explain, most
unhelpfully, that activities violating the campaign intervention
prohibition “include, but are not limited to, the publication or
distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral
statements on behalf of or in opposition to . . . a candidate.”53
45
46
47
48

Id. at (f)(3).
Id. at (b), (c).
I.R.C. § 4962(a)(1), (c); Treas. Reg. § 53.4955–1(d)(1) (as amended in 2009).
The House Report provided:

The adoption of an excise tax sanction does not modify the present-law rule that an
organization does not qualify for tax-exempt status as a charitable organization, and
is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, unless the organization does
not participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office.
H.R. REP. NO. 100–391, pt. 2, at 1624 (1987) (internal citations omitted). The regulations
under section 4955 also make this point: “The excise taxes imposed by section 4955 do not
affect the substantive standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) under which an
organization is described in section 501(c)(3) only if it does not participate or intervene in any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.” Treas. Reg. § 53.4955–1(a).
49 I.R.C. § 6852(a).
50 I.R.C. § 7409. There is no evidence that the IRS has ever asserted the authority to halt
or enjoin future campaign intervention.
51 Hickman, supra note 13, at 240 n.4.
52 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i)–(iii) (as amended in 2008).
53 Id. at (c)(3)(iii).
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Revenue rulings involving this issue provide additional guidance,
but always with the caveat that the determination of whether a
violation of the prohibition has occurred is a question of facts and
circumstances. Thus, Revenue Ruling 2007–41 lists several categories
that raise the potential for campaign intervention, and factors to be
considered for a number of such categories.54 It also offers twentyone examples of situations that would involve campaign
intervention.55 In the case of candidate appearances, for example,
factors include whether the organization provided other candidates
with an equal opportunity to participate, whether the organization
indicated any support or opposition to the candidate, and whether any
political fundraising occurred.56
The meaning of some of these factors is itself uncertain. What, for
example, indicates support or opposition during a candidate
appearance? What weight do we assign to each factor? In addition,
whenever “open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,”57 using the
Supreme Court’s language in Citizens United, are applied to a
particular factual situation, the result will be uncertain if different
factors point in different directions. An exempt organization can have
no confidence that its conclusion would be the same as that of the
IRS.
An earlier revenue ruling on voter guides further illustrated the
difficulty. Revenue Ruling 78–248 cautioned that campaign
intervention “depends upon all of the facts and circumstances.”58 It
54 Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–25 I.R.B. 1421. The categories are: 1) voter education, voter
registration and get out the vote drives; 2) individual activity by organization leaders; 3)
candidate appearances; 4) candidate appearance where speaking or participating as a noncandidate; 5) issue advocacy vs. political campaign intervention; 6) business activity; and 7)
web sites. Id. at 1422–26.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1423. In distinguishing issue advocacy from political campaign intervention, the
revenue ruling lists seven factors: (1) whether the statement at issue “identifies one or more
candidates for a given public office”; (2) whether it “expresses approval or disapproval for one
or more candidates’ positions and/or actions”; (3) “[w]hether the statement is delivered close in
time to the election”; (4) whether it “makes reference to voting or an election”; (5) whether “the
issue addressed in the communication has been raised as an issue distinguishing candidates for a
given office”; (6) “[w]hether the communication is part of an ongoing series of communications
by the organization on the same issues that are made independent” of any election; and (7)
“[w]hether the timing of the communication and identification of the candidates are related to a
non-electoral event such as a scheduled vote on specific legislation by an officeholder who also
happens to be a candidate for public office.” Id. at 1424. The ruling does note that a
“communication is particularly at risk of political campaign intervention when it makes [a]
reference to candidates or voting in a specific upcoming election.” Id. It then backs away from
even this statement by cautioning, “[n]evertheless, the communication must still be considered
in context before arriving at any conclusions.” Id.
57 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)).
58 Rev. Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154.
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then distinguished certain voter guides that would be permissible
voter education activities for a section 501(c)(3) organization from
some that would constitute impermissible campaign intervention.59 In
one permissible situation, the organization annually prepared and
made generally available to the public a compilation of the voting
records of all members of Congress on major issues involving a wide
range of subjects.60 The voter guide, however, did not include an
editorial opinion, and nothing in its structure or content implied
approval or disapproval of any member or the member’s voting
record.61 In one of the impermissible situations, an organization
primarily concerned with land conservation matters published a voter
guide widely distributed during an election campaign that was a
factual compilation of incumbent voting records on selected landconservation issues.62 Because the guide emphasized only one area,
however, the ruling concluded that its purpose was not non-partisan
voter education but forbidden political intervention.63
The ruling left organizations seeking guidance with a number of
questions. What is “a wide variety of issues”? How many issues are
enough? Can an organization, for example, emphasize a few issues,
listed without editorial comment, if they are those that reflect
particular political leanings, such as those on the left or the right? We
do not know.
As the Congressional Research Service has observed, neither tax
law nor the regulations offer much insight as to what activities are
banned for 501(c)(3) organizations prohibited from intervening in
political campaigns.64 The same is true in the case of revenue rulings.
In short, the legal commands from Congress and precedential
guidance, which is that included in the IRS cumulative bulletin,
provide standards and not rules.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION PROHIBITION
A key factor in Kaplow’s analysis is the level of enforcement of a
legal command.65 The defining characteristic of a standard is that it is
imbued with specific content only through ex post enforcement
See id. (discussing four different situations).
Id. (situation one).
61 Id.
62 Id. (situation four).
63 Id.
64 ERIKA LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33377, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS CRS–8 (2007), available
at, LEXIS, 2007 TNT 36–25.
65 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 562. Chronologically, enforcement occurs at stage three, but
because of its importance in Kaplow’s calculus, I discuss it first.
59
60
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actions. Thus, a low level of enforcement actions would suggest that
legal authority should promulgate a standard and rely on enforcement
actions to give content to the legal command, instead of developing a
rule with all the added costs of promulgating a rule. In the case of the
campaign intervention prohibition, however, IRS enforcement has, as
others have noted, “been spotty at best.”66
Judicial decisions are one means of explaining the content of the
legal rule ex post. Only a very small number of court decisions have
involved the campaign intervention prohibition. The best-known case
is the 2000 decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti.67 There, a
church had purchased full-page ads in two national newspapers
stating that voting for then-Presidential candidate Bill Clinton was
sinful and then asked for tax-deductible donations.68 The IRS revoked
the church’s exemption, an action that the appellate court upheld.69
The case involved undisputed express intervention. Thus, its
reasoning provided little guidance for the more difficult situation of
indirect intervention. Similarly, in the case of the Christian Echoes
Ministry, whose revocation of exemption the Tenth Circuit upheld in
1972, the political intervention was clear.70 Christian Echoes had
attacked various candidates it considered too liberal and endorsed
conservative candidates, such as Barry Goldwater.71
Association of the Bar of the City of New York v. Commissioner,72
however, offered guidance on a more subtle form of possible political
intervention: voter guides.73 The IRS denied the New York City Bar’s
bid for section 501(c)(3) status because it rated judicial candidates for
both appointive and elective judgeships at all levels of government as
“approved,” “not approved,” or “approved as highly qualified” on the
basis of professional ability, experience, character, temperament and
possession of any special qualifications. The Second Circuit held that
such activity, which the bar association conceded was intended to
ensure that unqualified candidates were not elected to office, violated
the political intervention prohibition, citing the Treasury regulation

66 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by
Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); see also Tobin, supra note 36, at 1356 (noting
“sporadic and potentially uneven enforcement”). I note that this Article in many places updates
Mayer’s work, and I thank him for his efforts.
67 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
68 Id. at 140.
69 Id. at 145.
70 Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972).
71 Id.
72 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988)
73 Id. at 877.
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forbidding intervening “directly or indirectly.”74 Conducting the
evaluations on a nonpartisan basis did not change the conclusion.
In a recent case, Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States,75 Catholic
Answers sought to limit the political intervention ban to express
advocacy.76 Catholic Answers, a tax-exempt religious corporation
challenged political activity excise taxes imposed against it under
section 4955 for posting e-letters from its founder and president
criticizing John Kerry, the then presumptive Democratic Party
presidential nominee.77 The organization was assessed and paid both
first- and second-tier taxes.78 Then, Catholic Answers timely
corrected the political intervention and requested a refund of the taxes
paid, which the IRS granted because the campaign intervention “was
not willful and flagrant.”79 Catholic Answers nonetheless filed suit
challenging the regulations addressing political intervention under
sections 4955 and 501(c)(3) on the grounds that they are
unconstitutional for lacking specificity, for being overbroad, and for
encompassing speech not limited to express advocacy or direct
contributions.80 The court, however, dismissed the complaint as moot
for two reasons: (1) the IRS abatement had rendered the refund claim
moot; and (2) because Catholic Answers had formed a new 501(c)(4)
organization to engage in political intervention, there were no issues
capable of repetition yet evading review.81 Thus, the case did not
provide any additional explication of the reach of the campaign
intervention prohibition.
Enforcement activity of the campaign intervention prohibition also
takes place short of judicial decisions. The IRS may revoke exempt
status or impose the campaign intervention excise tax in
administrative proceedings. Several constraints limit the usefulness of
such activity in giving content to the campaign intervention
prohibition. First, the IRS audits only a small number of exempt
organizations. The 2010 Annual Report from the IRS Exempt
74 Id. at 881 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2008)). See Rev.
Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154 and Rev. Rul. 80–282, 1980–2 C.B. 178 for revenue rulings that
address voter guides.
75 09–CV–670–IEG (AJB), 2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 09–56926,
2011 WL 2452177 (9th Cir. June 21, 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012)
(No. 11–511); see also Irma E. Gonzales, Court Dismisses Nonprofit Group’s Challenge to
Political Expenditures Tax, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 16, 2009, available at Lexis, 2009 TNT
198–13 (discussing and analyzing the Catholic Answers decision in detail).
76 Catholic Answers, 2009 WL 3320498, at *2.
77 Id. at *1.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *2.
80 Id.
81 Id. at *7–8.
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Organizations Division (“EO”) reported 10,187 returns examined in
fiscal year 2009 through traditional examinations and 6,773 through
less resource-intensive compliance checks.82 The reported numbers
for fiscal year 2010 were 11,449 and 3,893, respectively.83
With 776,300 returns processed for Calendar Year 2009,84 the
percentage of examinations would be approximately 1.47 percent for
2010 if the same number for returns were processed as in 2009. This
percentage, however, is somewhat misleading. The 2010 IRS Data
Book reveals that of the 11,449 returns examined in fiscal year 2010,
only 3,596 were annual information returns Forms 990 and 990-EZ,
one of which most tax-exempt organizations are required to provide
the IRS annually.85 Thus, using this data, the percentage of filed
returns examined drops to approximately 0.463 percent. Moreover,
for purposes of these statistics, “‘examined’ means ‘closed,’” and an
exempt organization audit may cover one, two or three years of
returns, all of which are closed in a single year.86 Thus, the number of
organizations examined may be even lower.87 These numbers are far
lower than audits of both personal returns and for-profit entities.88
Moreover, while in recent years, redacted revocations of exempt
status have been publicly available, administrative enforcement
actions are confidential and the details of particular cases become
public and thus provide guidance to other entities only if the
organization chooses to make them so.89
82 IRS EXEMPT ORGS., TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 2 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy2011_eo_workplan.pdf
[hereinafter
2010
Report].
“Compliance checks inquire about an item on a return or solicit information about an
organization’s operations . . . .” Id. The Form 990 itself leads to confusion in this area. The
glossary in the Instructions to the Form 990 define “political campaign activities” as “All
activities that support or oppose candidates for elective federal, state, or local public office.”
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 990 Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i990.pdf. While definitions in a glossary must be short, of course, this definition fails to
convey the breadth of political campaign activities as used by the IRS.
83 Id.
84 I.R.S. DATA BOOK, 2010, Pub. 55B, at 33 (2011) (noting in Table 13 stating data
regarding the returns of tax-exempt organizations, employee plans, and government entities),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10databk.pdf. The 2010 EO Report does not give
this data.
85 Id. The vast majority of other returns examined were employment tax returns.
86 Paul Streckfus, EO Tax Journal 2010–172, EO TAX JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://eotaxjournal.com/eotj/?m=201011.
87 Paul Streckfus, editor of the EO Tax Journal, estimated the rate at 0.2 percent. Id.
88 See infra text accompanying note 138 (describing the audit rates of tax payers other
than tax exempt organizations).
89 See, e.g., CBN Press Release on Agreement With IRS, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 16
1998, available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 55–78 (announcing that the IRS had revoked the tax-exempt
status of Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network and three of its former affiliates
because of campaign intervention); Falwell Responds to IRS Appeal for Money, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Feb. 17, 1993, available at LEXIS, 93 TNT 81–46 (announcing that the IRS had

2/13/2012 4:26:38 PM

658

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

Some additional data on an aggregate basis are available, however.
For example, from 2003 through 2005, on average fewer than twenty
organizations per year paid the excise for political expenditures under
section 4955, disqualifying lobbying expenditures under section 4912,
or premiums paid on personal benefit contracts, with an average paid
for all three of these taxes of less than $5,500 per year.90 For calendar
year 2010, the number of charities, private foundations, and split
interest trusts that paid tax on political expenditures was thirty-one
and the total amount paid was $40,413, for an average of $1,304 per
organization.91 For 2009, the number of charities, private foundations,
and split interest trusts that paid tax on these expenditures was fortyeight, and the total amount paid $1,371,176, for an average of
$28,566.92 For calendar year 2008, the number of charities, private
foundations, and split interest trusts paying such taxes totaled thirty
with total payments of $84,665, or an average of $2,822.93 Thus,
imposition of the section 4955 excise tax occurs only rarely and in
small amounts.
Between 2005 and 2007, the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of
sixty charities.94 From January 1, 2010 through April 4, 2011 alone,
the IRS revoked the charitable status of 212 organizations.95 The
results of the Political Activity Campaign Initiative discussed below,
however, indicate that only a few of these revocations related to
campaign intervention.96 More frequently, revocations or denials of
initial applications for recognition of exempt status occur for failure
to file required forms or as a result of private inurement, that is, selfdealing by organization insiders.97 A recent denial of exemption did

revoked the tax-exempt status of Jerry Falwell’s Old Time Gospel Hour for 1986 and 1987 for
campaign intervention).
90 Mayer, supra note 66, at 12 n.36.
91 SOI TAX STATISTICS, EXCISE TAXES REPORTED BY CHARITIES, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
AND SPLIT INTEREST TRUSTS ON FORM 4720, Calendar Year 2010, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10pf00et.xls. The IRS now aggregates the categories listed by
Mayer with such items as tax on prohibited tax shelters and taxable distribution of sponsoring
organizations.
92 SOI TAX STATISTICS, EXCISE TAXES REPORTED BY CHARITIES, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
AND SPLIT INTEREST TRUSTS ON FORM 4720, Calendar Year 2009, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09pf00et.xls.
93 SOI TAX STATISTICS, EXCISE TAXES REPORTED BY CHARITIES, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
AND SPLIT INTEREST TRUSTS ON FORM 4720, Calendar Year 2008, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08pf00et.xls.
94 Mayer, supra note 66, at 12.
95 IRS
RECENT REVOCATIONS OF 501(C)(3) DETERMINATIONS, available at
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=141466,00.html.
96 See infra note 104–34 and accompanying text (discussing an IRS initiative that
reviewed the campaign intervention prohibition).
97 For the period examined, revocations of exemptions for credit counseling organizations
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cite the campaign intervention prohibition as one reason for the
action, where the organization donated office space and telephone
lines to an affiliated section 527 organization without charging for
their use and allowed candidates to speak at the organization’s
events.98 In 2006, the IRS revoked the exemption as a section
501(c)(3) organization of an entity that placed a newspaper
advertisement opposing a candidate’s bid for office, made two
“massive mailings” to the general public, and had a truck with signs
opposing the candidate’s ticket driven across the country for four
months.99
That is not to say that redacted guidance lacks relevance to the
enforcement of the campaign intervention prohibition. The IRS
publishes redacted Technical Advice Memoranda (TAM), which
constitute answers by the Office of Chief Counsel to questions that
arise in the field, usually during examinations.100 A 2009 TAM found
prohibited campaign intervention where a charity failed to distinguish
web pages that contained candidate-related material from its other
web pages when the website was operated jointly by the charity and
its affiliated social welfare organization.101 A 2004 TAM concluded
that a charity’s administration of a payroll deduction plan that
allowed contributions to an industry political action campaign
violated the campaign intervention prohibition and justified
imposition of the section 4955 excise tax.102 In 1996, a TAM
concluded that a loan to a political organization violated the campaign
intervention prohibition because a contribution to a political
organization is defined to include a loan and that the loan transaction
justified imposition of the section 4955 excise tax.103
By far the best evidence of IRS enforcement policy in this area as
well as of the public’s understanding of, and compliance with, the
prohibition is the IRS Political Activity Campaign Initiatives
were particularly numerous. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010–17–077 (Jan. 8, 2010), I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009–50–051 (Sept. 14, 2009), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009–15–059 (Jan. 6, 2009).
Congress in 2006 enacted new standards applicable to exemption by credit counseling
organizations. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280 § 1220(a), 120 Stat. 780,
1086 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(q)).
98 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010–20–021 (Feb. 25, 2010).
99 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007–24–033 (April 16, 2006).
100 Understanding
IRS
Guidance:
A
Brief
Primer,
I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101102,00.html (last updated May 20, 2011). TAMS are the
basis for revenue rulings.
101 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009–08–050 (Feb. 20, 2009).
102 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004–46–033.
103 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98–12–001 (Aug. 21, 1996). For description of the few other
TAMs since 1991 involving the campaign intervention prohibition, see Mayer, supra note 66, at
12–13 n.37.
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(“PACI”) for 2004, 2006, and 2008. The initiative’s objective was
precisely “to establish the IRS enforcement presence.”104 Using
referrals, the IRS examined, on an expedited and focused basis,
possible campaign intervention in each of those election cycles.105 In
so doing, it distinguished between single-issue cases and more
complicated ones involving multiple issues.106 In the 2004 and 2006
election cycles, violations were evenly split between churches and
other types of section 501(c)(3) organizations,107 and the IRS
undertook to follow the procedural requirements for church audits.108
In 2004, the IRS received 166 referrals, selected 110 organizations for
examination, and found violations in nearly 75 percent of the
organizations examined.109 The most common violations identified
were distribution of printed documents supporting candidates,
statements endorsing candidates during normal services, well-known
individuals endorsing a candidate at an official function, candidates
speaking at official functions, distribution of improper voter guides or
candidate ratings, posting of signs on the organization’s property,
endorsing candidates on the organization’s website or through links
on its website, verbal endorsements by an organization’s official,
political contributions to a candidate, and non-candidate endorsement
of a candidate at an official function of the organization.
The statutory prohibition by its terms is absolute such that even a
de minimis amount of political campaign intervention could result in
loss of exemption. The lack of statutorily authorized intermediate
sanctions complicates enforcement.110 The statute’s only option is
104 Political Activities Compliance Initiative Final Report, IRS, 1 (Feb. 24, 2006)
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf [hereinafter 2004 PACI Report].
105 For criticism of IRS reliance on referrals, see Mayer, supra note 66, at 25–27.
106 2004 PACI Report, supra note 104, at 6.
107 See I.R.C. § 7611 (2006) (imposing “reasonable belief” and notice requirements that
must be satisfied before the IRS may begin a church tax inquiry). The IRS regulations
implementing this code section were subsequently held invalid. United States v. Living Word
Christian Ctr., No. 08–mc–37 ADM/JJK, 2009 WL 250049, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2009). The
IRS has proposed but not finalized new regulations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7611–1, 74
Fed. Reg. 39003 (Aug. 5, 2009) (providing “Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Q&A
Relating to Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations”); 2010–2011 Priority Guidance Plan,
I.R.S., 10 (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2010-2011_pgp.pdf (including final
7611 regulations as a priority).
108 2004 PACI Report, supra note 104, at 9.
109 2006 Political Activities Compliance Initiative, I.R.S., 1 (May 30, 2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2006paci_report_5-30-07.pdf [hereinafter 2006 PACI Report].
Id. at 4; see also Fred Stokeld, Referrals of Possible Campaign Intervention by Charities Not
Always Promptly Processed Timely, Says TIGTA, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 1, 2008), available
at, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 127–5 (reporting that sixty-three out of 100 referrals in the 2006 PACI
were not completed in a timely manner).
110 Senate Staff Memorandum, supra note 36, at 55, notes this problem but does not
suggest amending the statute to include sanctions short of revocation.
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revocation for even the smallest violation, but the IRS is
understandably hesitant to invoke such a severe sanction for minor
violations. In the 2004 PACI, the IRS revoked exemption in five
cases and proposed revocation in two more, although one revocation
related to issues other than campaign intervention.111 In 66 percent of
2004 PACI cases, however, the IRS engaged in self-help regarding
available sanctions by issuing written advisories,112 as it did in
connection with All Saints Episcopal Church.113 The reason for these
advisories, it explained, was that:
[t]he act of intervention was of a one-time, nonrecurring
nature, or was taken in good faith reliance on advice of
counsel, or was otherwise shown to be an anomaly; [t]he
organization corrected the intervention, including recovery of
expenditures, to the extent possible, and established that it
had taken steps to prevent any future political intervention
within the meaning of section 501(c)(3); and [t]he assessment
of the section 4955 tax was unavailable.114
The report on the 2004 PACI was careful to specify that “the term
‘no-change written advisory’ has a broader meaning in the context of
PACI than it is usually understood to mean.”115 The term was not
being limited to issues or activities that were insubstantial, but “if
conducted to a greater extent, could affect the organization’s exempt
status,” since technically under the law, any amount of campaign
intervention, no matter how small, results in loss of exemption.116 The
report specifically noted confusion with the meaning of the statutory
prohibition and that, “in cases concerning churches, the phrase had
been interpreted to mean that the prohibition on political intervention
. . . was limited to expressly endorsing or opposing candidates.”117
The IRS repeated the program in 2006; referrals increased to 237,
but the IRS selected 100 for examination, with results similar to that
for 2004.118 Unlike the 2004 efforts, however, it identified six cases in
111 2006

PACI Report, supra note 109, at 5.

112 Id.
113 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the All Saints Episcopal Church’s
violation and sanctions imposed by the IRS).
114 2004 PACI Report, supra note 104, at 18.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 21–22.
118 2006 PACI Report, supra note 109, at 1, 4. A report of the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) regarding the 2004 PACI urged IRS examiners to make
clearer statements in closing letters about whether a prohibited political activity violation
occured. Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit to Comm’r,
Tax Exempt and Gov’t Div., at 2
(May 12, 2009), available at
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which an organization’s facilities were used for political campaign
intervention.119 It also undertook a follow-up process for its 2004
examinations and found no repeat campaign intervention.120 In
addition, unlike the 2004 efforts, the IRS conducted independent
research on various state campaign finance report databases and
found 269 apparent cases of direct contributions to candidates.121 It
found the same types of violations that it did in the previous election
cycle, but did not revoke or propose revocation in any case.122 Rather,
it issued written advisories in 65 percent of closed cases.123
The IRS continued the initiative in 2008, with an announced
emphasis on internet activity.124 The 2010 Annual Report from the
director of exempt organizations provides the only information on the
2008 PACI.125 According to the 2010 Annual Report, the IRS
investigated 133 allegations of political activity for the 2008 election
cycle, more than in 2004 and 2006.126 The 2010 Annual Report
detailed few other results. While the report described the same
categories of violations, no data on political contributions were noted.
The 2008 PACI involved forty-seven allegations of a church official
endorsing a candidate during normal services, as compared to
nineteen in 2004 and fourteen in 2006.127 Thus, the earlier PACIs and
attempts at education, including publishing a revenue ruling and a
guide for churches and religious organizations, discussed below,128
did not result in any clear evidence of increased compliance.

http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200910080fr.pdf. In its examination of
the 2006 PACI, TIGTA said the IRS had improved but nonetheless recommended that
organizations be notified more promptly regarding the examination. Fred Stokeld, Referrals of
Possible Campaign Intervention by Charities Not Always Promptly Processed Timely, Says
TIGTA, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 2008, available at LEXIS, 2008 TNT 127–5.
119 2006 PACI Report, supra note 109, at 4.
120 Id. at 5.
121 Id. at 6.
122 Id. at 5.
123 Id.
124 See
I.R.S. News Release IR–2008–61 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=181570,00.html (announcing the 2008 PACI
program); Memorandum from Marsha A. Ramirez, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Examinations to All
Exempt Orgs. Revenue Agents (July 28, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/internetfielddirective072808.pdf (providing guidance for revenue agents on dealing with
tax exempt organizations websites).
125 2010 Report, supra note 82, at 20 available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/fy2011_eo_workplan.pdf (noting the types and amounts of 2008 allegations).
126 Id. at 20.
127 Id.; see infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text for discussion of an initiative by
one church group that may have produced or at least influenced these figures.
128 See infra notes 154–159 (discussing IRS initiatives to educate nonprofit organizations
about the campaign intervention prohibition).
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The 2010 Annual Report stated that the IRS revoked the taxexempt status of seven noncompliant organizations over the three
years of the PACI.129 When the report was released, Director of
Exempt Organizations Lois Lerner explained that investigations
substantiated allegations against more than half of the organizations,
with most receiving only a warning.130 According to Lerner, the three
most common complaints were “church officials making a statement
for or against a candidate during normal services; exempt
organizations distributing printed documents supporting candidates;
and organizations endorsing candidates on their websites or through
links to their websites. Close behind were organizations making
political contributions to candidates.”131
The 2010 Annual Report did not include complaints for the 2010
election year because the IRS’s exempt organizations division was
still going through the classification process. Moreover, it stated that
the IRS has moved from “project to process,” meaning that it will be
“winding down . . . separate, formal projects, and assimilating them
into [its] general casework.”132 The IRS has not indicated publicly any
intention to conduct a PACI for 2010.133 That is, we can expect no
further PACI efforts. A high profile enforcement undertaken by PACI
has fizzled away.
Even with the PACI’s sustained audit, enforcement levels of the
campaign intervention prohibition have been low, relying primarily
on referrals, rather than any systematic audit or examination by the
IRS. Under stage one of Kaplow’s calculus, a low level of
enforcement activity usually favors the development of standards
because “the added cost from having resolved the issue on a
wholesale basis at the promulgation stage will [not] be outweighed by
the benefit of having avoided additional costs repeatedly incurred in

129 2010

Report, supra note 82, at 20.

130 Id.
131 Diane Freda, Political Activity Revocations Reported; IRS Work Plan Outlines
501(c)(4) Focus,
BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORT (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=18838983&vname=mpebulalli
ssues&fn=18838983&jd=a0c5r5r3a1&split=0. It is not clear to what extent these violations
involved direct or indirect intervention. For example, we do not know what kind of statements
church officials made, that is, whether they were express advocacy or statements at the margin
between intervention and issue advocacy. Nonetheless, the 2010 Annual Report belies the
argument made by the Senate Staff Memorandum, supra note 36, at 3, that enforcement of the
prohibition is not feasible. Statements made in church services may be difficult to detect, but
voter guides, candidate contributions, and statements on web pages are not.
132 2010 Report, supra note 82, at 16.
133 ERIKA
K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33377, TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 11
(2010), available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 190–34.
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giving content to a standard on a retail basis.”134 Kaplow observes
that, if the relevant facts vary widely, “[d]esigning a rule that
accounts for every relevant contingency would be wasteful, as most
would never arise.”135 In other words, situations in which a particular
set of facts will occur only rarely suggest reliance on standards, not
rules. While the IRS routinely cautions that violations of the
campaign intervention prohibition depend on facts and circumstances,
the results of the PACI suggest that violations fall into clear and
relatively few categories.
Kaplow, as noted earlier, cautions that when a legal command
affects millions, a rule may be preferable even when enforcement
activity is low.136 He uses tax, which is well-known for its enormous
number of rules, as an example of such a category.137 The audit rate is
low for all taxpayers, not just section 501(c)(3) organizations.138 The
intervention prohibition applicable to section 501(c)(3) organizations
affects hundreds of thousands of organizations,139 and this fact argues
for rules rather than standards, despite the low level of enforcement.
Moreover, in the case of section 501(c)(3), the number of
organizations subject to the prohibition is closely related to the nature
of those subject to the legal command, a consideration which figures
prominently in Kaplow’s stage two, to which we now turn.
IV. THE AFFECTED COMMUNITY
Equally important to the Kaplow calculus is the nature of the
community affected by the legal command because the nature of the
community shapes how members of the community will learn about
it. “Being imperfectly informed of the law’s commands,” Kaplow
posits, affected parties may “act based on their best guess of the law,”

134 Kaplow,

supra note 18, at 563.

135 Id.
136 See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text (discussing stage one in Kaplow’s
analysis).
137 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 564.
138 The IRS audited 1.1 percent of all personal returns in fiscal year 2010, the highest rate
in a decade. Nicole Duarte, Tax Practitioners Expect More Audit Growth in 2011, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Dec. 17, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 242–5. Audits for small businesses (those
with less than $10 million in assets) increased to 0.94 percent from 0.85 percent in 2009. Id.
Those for midsize corporate taxpayers (those with between $10 million and $50 million in
assets) increased to 10.95 percent from 10.10 percent in 2009. Id. Audits for the largest
corporations declined in 2010, from 25.70 percent in 2009 to 23.44 percent in 2010. IRS
Releases Fiscal 2010 Enforcement Statistics, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 2010, available at
LEXIS, 2010 TNT 241–17. In 2005, the ten year high, audit rates for the largest corporations was
44.10 percent. Id..
139 See infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the number of organizations
affected).
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or they may seek to acquire legal information.140 Those affected by
the legal command may acquire information by seeking professional
legal advice, through study of government resources, through
information disseminated by trade groups, through other third-party
resources, or by other means. They will do so, however, only if the
perceived value of acquiring legal advice exceeds the perceived
cost,141 and the costs of acquiring legal advice about a standard are
greater than those of acquiring such advice about a rule.142 Two
considerations are relevant: (1) whether members of the affected
community have the resources to acquire legal advice about the
application of a standard; and (2) how they perceive the likelihood
and burden of possible sanctions.
The community of organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3)
is diverse and numerous. According to the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (“NCCS”), the number of all section 501(c)(3)
organizations, both public charities and private foundations, was
1,574,674 as of August 2011.143 Most of the NCCS information is
based on organizations that file the Form 990, the annual
information return required for most organizations exempt under
section 501(c), although it includes numbers for non-reporting
organizations. The number also includes an estimated 278,772
churches, based on the website of American Church Lists in 2004,
only about half of which have filed a 1023 application for
exemption form with the IRS.144 This large number of entities
subject to the campaign intervention prohibition suggests that the
IRS should develop rules, at least for common situations, rather
than rely entirely on standards.
In 2009, the NCCS approximated as 691,008 the number of
section 501(c)(3) organizations not reporting or not required to file
140 Kaplow,

supra note 18, at 562.
at 571. The value of advice includes both the benefit of undertaking permitted acts
that affected parties would have avoided without information and avoiding those not permitted
that they would have undertaken without the information, in each case weighted by the
likelihood of occurrence. Id.
142 Id. at 569.
143 Quick
Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT.,
http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) [hereinafter NCCS
Quick Stats]. The 1,574,674 section 501(c) organizations include 959,698 public charities,
100,337 private foundations, and 514,639 miscellaneous. Id.
144 See Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1999 – 2009, NAT’L
CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT., http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1.php (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011) [hereinafter NCCS Numbers] (noting that about half of the estimated
number of congregations are registered with the IRS based on the American Church List
website). Churches are not required to file Form 1023, the application for exemption, or Form
990, the Annual Information Return, required of other section 501(c)(3) organizations. See
I.R.C. §§ 508(c)(1)(A), 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
141 Id.
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Form 990 because they normally have less than $25,000 in gross
receipts.145 That is, 43 percent of all organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(3) and more than 68 percent of public charities were
churches or normally had annual gross receipts of less than
$25,000.146 Another recent report stated that 41 percent of returns
filed by section 501(c)(3) organizations were filed by organizations
with assets of less than $100,000.147
Other data further emphasize the large percentage of tax-exempt
organizations that are very small. The Pension Protection Act of 2006
mandated that organizations with gross receipts less than $25,000 file
(other than churches) a very short new Form 990, known as the 990-N
or e-Postcard.148 The deadline to file this form was May 17, 2010,
although the IRS later extended the deadline to October 15, 2010.149
This requirement reaches beyond section 501(c)(3) organizations
subject to the campaign intervention prohibition. A 2010 NCCS
report gave as the total number of registered 501(c) organizations as
1,617,447, and the number of organizations required to file the ePostcard as 714,379.150 That is, of all organizations registered under
section 501(c), those with gross receipts normally under $25,000 are
more than 45 percent.151 If the ratio of organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(3) to organizations exempt under provisions of section
501(c) in 2010 is the same as that for 2009, more than 70 percent, or
145 NCCS

Numbers, supra note 144.

146 Id.
147 Paul Arnsberger & Mike Graham, Charities, Social Clubs, and Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 2007, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Fall 2010, at 169, 169–70, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07eocharteobull.pdf.
148 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280, § 1223(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1090
(2006) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 6033(i) (2006)). The IRS has increased the limits for filing this
short form for any tax year beginning after December 31, 2009 to any organization that
normally has gross receipts of $50,000 or less. IRS Issues Guidance Relieving Some Small
Organizations of Information Reporting, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 14, 2011, available at LEXIS,
2011 TNT 10–6.
149 IRS Releases FAQ on One-Time Filing Relief Program for Small Charities, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 167–47.
150 Amy Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: A Look at
Organizations That May Have Their Tax-Exempt Status Revoked, NAT’L CENTER FOR
CHARITABLE STAT, 1 (July 8, 2010), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412135-tax-exemptstatus.pdf. In the 2010 Annual Report, the IRS director of the exempt organizations division
reported that 335,952 Form 990-Ns had been filed by October 15, 2010. 2010 Report, supra
note 82, at 9.
151 The largest percentage (26 percent) of Form 990-N filers are in the human services
subsector. Katie L. Roeger, Small Nonprofit Organizations: A Profile of Form 990-N Filers,
URBAN INSTITUTE, 1–2 (Aug. 2010), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412197-nonprofitform990-profile.pdf. This includes homeless shelters, soup kitchens, senior centers, meals on
wheels. Id. The next largest group (22 percent) is in the public and societal benefit subsectors,
such as civil rights groups, neighborhood block associations. Id. In contrast, health
organizations and human service organizations tend to be larger. Id. at 3.
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more than 500,000, of these very small organizations will be currently
exempt under section 501(c)(3).
Thus, a large percentage of organizations exempt under section
501(c)(3)—and thus subject to the campaign intervention
prohibition—are very small. Small organizations, which by definition
have few funds, are unlikely to devote scarce resources to engage
professionals to help them interpret the current standards that the IRS
uses to interpret and apply the prohibition.152 Kaplow reminds us that
advice about a standard is more difficult and expensive than advice
about a rule “[b]ecause a standard requires a prediction of how an
enforcement authority will decide questions that are already answered
in the case of a rule . . . .”153 Thus, even larger 501(c)(3) entities,
which just miss the 990-N limit, and still have limited resources, may
choose to become less informed regarding standards than they would
a rule. Furthermore, these types of organizations are likely to look to
sources other than professional advisors.
The IRS, recognizing this problem, has worked to educate section
501(c)(3) organizations and others about the campaign intervention
prohibition. After the 2004 and 2006 PACI, the IRS published a fact
sheet that contained detailed examples of the types of activities that
the IRS investigated during the 2004 election cycle.154 It followed this
fact sheet with Revenue Ruling 2007–41,155 and also updated its
webpage.156 During the 2008 PACI, taking further steps to raise
awareness, the IRS: (1) wrote letters to the national political party
committees explaining the prohibition; (2) published a letter in the
Federal Election Commission’s monthly newsletter asking candidates
to ensure that their contacts with charitable organizations do not
jeopardize the entity’s exemption; (3) issued a new release reminding
charities and churches of the ban; and (4) made public an internal
memorandum describing the 2008 PACI.157 The IRS has a number of
resources on its webpage addressing the prohibition, including a
152 It may be that not all categories of section 501(c)(3) organizations are equally likely to
engage in behavior that calls into issue the campaign intervention prohibition. See Colinvaux,
supra note 36, at 699–707 (discussing criticism and justifications for the rule).
153 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 569.
154 I.R.S.
News
Release
FS–2006–17
(Feb.
2006),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154712,00.html.
155 Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–25 I.R.B. 1421.
156 See TIGTA Says Further Improvements to Exempt Orgs Outreach Possible, TAX NOTES
TODAY, JULY 1, 2008, available at LEXIS, 2008 TNT 127–30 (discussing the improvements that
the IRS made to aid 501(c)(3) organizations’ understanding of the political intervention
prohibition).
157 See
Political Activities Compliance Initiative (2008 Election), I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=181565,00.html (last updated Aug. 10,
2010) (noting the educational components of the 2008 PACI).
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frequently asked questions (“FAQ”) section.158 It has published the
Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations, which includes
a number of examples involving the prohibition.159
Despite all these admirable attempts, however, the value of this
guidance is limited because the IRS is trying to explain and enforce a
standard, namely, that violations of the campaign intervention depend
on facts and circumstances. For example, the FAQs include the
question of whether an “organization can state its position on public
policy issues that candidates for public office are divided on.”160 It
answers:
An organization may take position on public policy issues,
including issues that divide candidates in an election for
public office as long as the message does not in any way
favor or oppose a candidate. Be aware that the message does
not need to identify the candidate by name to be prohibited
political campaign activity. A message that shows a picture of
a candidate, refers to a candidate’s political party affiliations,
or contains other distinctive features of a candidate’s platform
or biography may result in prohibited political campaign
activity.161
That answer gives little guidance. For example, what are distinctive
features of a candidate’s platform? Unlike Revenue Ruling 2007–41,
the FAQs do not mention the organization’s past and continuing
discussion of the public policy issue as a mitigating factor,162
introducing tension between official and unofficial IRS guidance.
Other tax-exempt organizations also offer guidance to their own
and other section 501(c)(3) organizations. To name just two as

158 See Political Campaign Intervention by 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations Educating
Exempt
Organizations,
I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=179750,00.html (last updated Nov. 19,
2010) (listing the available resources); Frequently Asked Questions About the Ban on Political
Campaign
Intervention
by
501(c)(3)
Organizations,
I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=179432,00.html (last updated Sept. 21,
2011) [hereinafter 501(c)(3) FAQs] (answering frequently asked questions regarding the
political campaign intervention ban).
159 I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, Pub. No. 1828
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
160 501(c)(3) FAQs, supra note 158 (question 8).
161 Id.
162 Compare Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–25 I.R.B. 1421, 1424 (noting that one factor is
“[w]hether the communication is part of an ongoing series of communications by the
organization on the same issues that are made independent”), with 501(c)(3) FAQs, supra note
158 (answer to question 8) (noting only that “[a] message that . . . contains other distinctive
features of a candidates platform . . . may result in prohibited political campaign activity”).
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examples, both the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,163
and the American Library Association maintain guidance regarding
the prohibition on their web pages.164 Guidance about permissible
activity is also important. As Kaplow observes, legal knowledge may
also cause those subject to a legal command to engage in conduct that
they had mistakenly thought was forbidden or subject them to
sanctions they thought severe but are in fact quite minor.165 The
Alliance for Justice is one of several organizations that have been
active in explaining to charities the kind of activities that the
campaign intervention prohibition leaves them free to undertake.166
Nonetheless, the IRS’s position that violation depends on the facts
and circumstances limits the guidance any organization can provide.
A standard is unlikely to provide the answers small organizations,
which generally do not have the luxury of hiring tax professionals,
need in reaching a conclusion regarding the application of the law to a
particular fact pattern, particularly an unusual one. In addition, the
light sanctions that the IRS has imposed for at least the first identified
violation, as the PACI results indicate, may further undermine the
incentive of affected entities to parse the meaning of a standard, much
less pay someone else to do so on their behalf.
In contrast to the implications of the low level of enforcement, the
large number of affected entities (a high percentage of which are very
small entities) to which the prohibition applies suggests that the IRS
and the Treasury should develop rules rather than rely on standards.
The nature of the community affected by the campaign intervention
prohibition calls for tax authorities to invest the resources to develop
a set of rules rather than standards regarding the prohibition.
Kaplow considers the value a party puts on conduct from which it
is deterred or permitted as the result of a legal command within his
stage two.167 In the case of the campaign intervention prohibition, the
value a charity places on political intervention is closely related to its
own norms, and I will discuss issues related to norms, both of the
affected charities and the IRS, which I believe bear on the decision
between a standard and a rule, below.
163 Political Activity Guidelines, U.S. CONF. OF C ATH. BISHOPS (July 7, 2007),
http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/political-activity-guidelines.cfm#37.
164 Election
Year Do’s and Don’ts, AM. LIBR. ASS’N (Mar. 2008),
http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/governance/legalguidelines/electiondosanddonts/electionyear.cf
m.
165 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 571.
166 See Nonprofit and Foundation Advocacy, ALLIANCE FOR JUST., http://www.afj.org/fornonprofits-foundations/ (last visited Sept 26, 2011) (listing various publications about non-profit
organizations’ advocacy about public policy).
167 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 571.
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V. APPLICABLE NORMS
Kaplow states that the quality of a legal command “can be
understood as reflecting how closely it conforms to underlying
norms,”168 and throughout his article stresses that legal authorities
should evaluate whether a rule or a standard is more likely to
motivate behavior consistent with the underlying norm. For example,
he notes that, if individuals will become better informed under a rule
than under a standard, they will behave more in accord with legal
norms,169 even though “it is usually said that standards result in more
precise application of underlying norms because they can be applied
to the particular facts of a case.”170 He acknowledges but does not
discuss in any detail the impact of different possible legal norms.171
In particular, nowhere does Kaplow discuss explicitly the case in
which the decision-maker’s and the affected parties’ beliefs about the
underlying norms differ, and the effect of such a scenario on the
choice between rules and standards. Yet, because standards give less
ex ante content to a legal command, those subject to a standard (or
their advisors) have more freedom to interpret the command. In so
doing, we can expect them to bring their understanding of the
underlying norms to bear. If those charged with carrying out the legal
command and those subject to it come with different understandings
of the underlying norms, the two groups may interpret a standard in
very different ways, complicating education and compliance.
As Russell Korobkin explains in his behavioral analysis of rules
and standards,172 in the case of a standard, two competing behavioral
biases come into play. On one hand, the general tendency toward risk
aversion—i.e., the reluctance to take a position with an uncertain
payoff—may cause some affected parties to unknowingly over
comply with the law.173 On the other hand, the self-serving bias—i.e.,
the phenomenon that individuals are likely to interpret ambiguous
information in ways that resound to their benefit—is also present.174
The impact of the self-serving bias may mean that unknowing
168 Id.

at 579 n.52.
at 575.
170 Id. at 622.
171 For example, Kaplow refers to questions about the appropriate norms for a given
situation. See id. at 582 n.62 (whether considering only safety and time or also energy
conservation in designing laws governing driving); id. at 594 n.98 (referring to Prof. Frederick
Schauer’s distinction between a decision maker consulting a single background justification or
all possible justificatory norms).
172 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 46 (2000).
173 Id.
174 Id.
169 Id.
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violations of the law “may be more prevalent than previously
thought.”175
A system of factors, as the IRS has provided for many iterations of
the campaign intervention prohibition, allows those affected “to
weigh each factor as [it] chooses.”176 The self-serving bias likely
leads organizations to emphasize factors that favor their positions.
That is, standards give discretion not only to administrators, as many
have observed,177 but also to the affected community. A rule, in
contrast, leaves less room for ex ante interpretation by those subject
to the legal command by recourse to underlying norms. Cass Sunstein
puts it succinctly, “By settling cases in advance, rules . . . make it
unnecessary and even illegitimate to return to first principles.”178
Thus, especially when the affected parties’ and administrators’
understanding of underlying norms differ, a rule may promote greater
compliance with the legal command. Different understandings of
underlying norms are, I believe, very much the case for the campaign
intervention prohibition. First, the parties’ interpretations about the
purpose can diverge because of the lack of congressional explanation
of the provision’s purpose, and second, because the IRS and section
501(c)(3) organizations diverge as to the role of the First Amendment
as an underlying norm.
Statements of congressional purpose can guide both administrators
and affected parties in understanding the reach and meaning of a legal
command.179 Congress, however, did not provide legislative history
about its purpose in adopting the campaign intervention prohibition.
Then-Senator Lyndon Johnson inserted the campaign intervention
prohibition as a floor amendment to legislation that produced the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954;180 the applicable statutory provisions
at the time limited only lobbying activity.
There is no legislative history explaining Congress’s reasoning in
first adopting the provision.181 Many who have examined the
175 Id. Korobkin notes that “[t]he self-serving bias is less problematic in a rules regime”
and that “the self-serving bias . . . suggests that standards will chill less desirable behavior than
otherwise would be expected.” Id. at 46–47. But see Guinane, supra note 15, at 152 (reporting
that in one survey, 43 percent of those 501(c)(3) organizations surveyed incorrectly believed
they could not host a candidate debate or forum).
176 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1012 (1995).
177 See, e.g., id. at 960–61 (discussing the concept of “untrammeled discretion”); see also
Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 S.M.U.
L. REV. 9, 22–33 (2001) (reviewing uses of rules to limit administrative discretion).
178 Sunstein, supra note 176, at 975.
179 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 321, 329 (1990) (discussing the problematic use of legislative history by courts).
180 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954).
181 Johnson stated:
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legislative record have concluded that its motive was simply political
animus: Senator Johnson was responding to attacks on him by
conservative charities in his recent reelection campaign. 182 As others
have documented, however, Johnson’s floor amendment came after
months of House investigation of the political activities of charitable
organizations.183 The first of two committees conducting this
investigation was charged with determining “whether foundations
have been infiltrated by communists”;184 the second with determining
whether charitable organizations were “using their resources for unAmerican and subversive activities.”185 The second committee
recommended that charities be forbidden to engage in both lobbying
and political campaigns, “leaving it to the courts to apply the maxim
of de minimis non curat lex.”186 Based on that recommendation, some
have asserted that Johnson sought to head off an even more restrictive
rule.187 Even if such is the case, the legislative record at the time of

Mr. President, this amendment seeks to extend the provisions of Section 501 of the
House bill, denying tax-exempt status to not only those people who influence
legislation but also to those who intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for any public office. I have discussed the matter with the chairman of the
committee, the minority ranking member of the committee, and several other
members of the committee, and I understand that the amendment is acceptable to
them. I hope the chairman will take it to conference, and that it will be included in
the final bill which Congress passes.
Id. As others have noted, this statement seems to assume that all lobbying by section
501(c)(3) organizations is prohibited, while in fact lobbying at the time was permitted, so long
as it was not substantial. See Colinvaux, supra note 36, at 690–99 (discussing the history of the
prohibition); Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, 2002 EO CPE TEXT
335, 336–37, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (discussing the history
of IRC 501(c)(3)).
182 See e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 678 (9th ed.
2007) (claiming the amendment was offered over concerns regarding the funding for Johnson’s
primary election opponent); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation,
and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and
Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2003) (discussing the political landscape of
Johnson’s 1954 election as the motivating factor); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the
Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by
Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 768 (2001) (arguing Johnson’s motivation for the amendment
was to stop corporate donations to conservative educational entities arrayed against him).
183 See Colinvaux, supra note 36, at 694–96 (reviewing committee activity leading up to
Johnson’s amendment); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate: Never the
Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 49–57 (2003) (revisiting the congressional committee
history prior to the amendment); see also Kindell & Reilly, supra note 181, at 448–51
(discussing various scenarios explaining why Johnson offered the amendment).
184 Murphy, supra note 183, at 49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
185 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 1 (1954).
186 Id. at 219.
187 Kindell & Reilly, supra note 181, at 449.
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the prohibition’s adoption did not offer the purpose of or the reasons
for the rule.
Legislative history from 1987 explains that the ban “reflect[s] [a]
Congressional policy that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in
political affairs . . . .”188 The fact that a number of other categories of
tax-exempt organizations are permitted to engage in political
campaign intervention undercuts this rationale. These other categories
of tax-exempt organizations, however, are not eligible to receive taxdeductible contributions. Thus, a more persuasive justification for the
prohibition is that Congress did not wish to allow tax-deductible
contributions to be used for political campaign intervention. Stated
succinctly by Judge Learned Hand, political controversies “must be
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from
them.”189
Even if accepted, that justification offers little guidance. It does
not help the IRS determine how to give content to and administer the
rule or help others trying to sort out a facts-and-circumstances test in
light of the underlying principles the rule is intended to advance. It
may, however, suggest that the campaign intervention prohibition
should be interpreted broadly.
Whatever the policy reasons for the campaign intervention
prohibition, its application is complicated further by the First
Amendment protection that many affected parties assert. What
matters for an administrator choosing between a rule and a standard
under Kaplow’s analysis is not whether those making such
constitutional arguments are correct,190 but only that they believe the
arguments to be correct and, in practice, base their behavior on them.
A number of church groups believe that any formulation of the
prohibition violates their constitutionally guaranteed free exercise of
religion. The Alliance Defense Fund (“ADF”) has sponsored three
annual “Pulpit Freedom Sundays.”191 Ministers participating preach
about how scripture applies to every area of life, including, if they
188 H.R. REP. NO. 100–391, pt. 2, at 1625 (1987); see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics,
and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 843–44 (2001) (discussing
Congress’s purpose).
189 Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (upholding constitutional limits on lobbying
by section 501(c)(3) organizations on the basis that there is no duty to subsidize First
Amendment activity). It is generally assumed that the same reasoning applies to the campaign
intervention prohibition. See Aprill, supra note 188, at 843–44 (discussing rationales for the
prohibition on section 501(c)(3) organizations).
190 That is, I am not making a rights-based argument.
191 Participants in Annual Pulpit Freedom Sunday Increase for Third Year, ALLIANCE
DEF.
FUND
(Sept.
27,
2010)
[hereinafter
ADF
Pulpit
Freedom],
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/4361.
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choose, candidates for election. The ADF has organized Pulpit
Freedom Sunday in hopes that the IRS will revoke the exemption of
at least some participating churches so that the ADF can challenge the
constitutionality of the political campaign intervention prohibition.192
Although it is unclear how many ministers actually engaged in
forbidden political campaign intervention rather than permitted issue
advocacy, the ADF reported that approximately one hundred churches
from thirty states participated in the 2010 Pulpit Freedom Sunday,193
more than in 2009 (eighty-four) and in 2008 (about three dozen).194
Those that believe that any limitation on the speech of churches
violates their constitutional free exercise rights will not care whether
the legal command is embodied in a rule or a standard.195 That is, they
question the statutory legal command and not just the IRS’s efforts to
interpret and enforce the command.
Others take the position that speech regarding political candidates
benefits from First Amendment protection because it is core First
Amendment speech. Catholic Answers took that position in Catholic
Answers, Inc. v. United States, challenging the applicable regulations
on First Amendment grounds.196 The IRS’s reliance on vague
standards, these critics argue, chills section 501(c)(3) organizations
from expressing their views, and undermines their freedom of
association.197 That view of the First Amendment calls for reading the
legal commands narrowly, as applying to only limited types of
speech. Critics look especially to Federal Election Commission v.
192 See Bob Unruh, See What Has the IRS Stopped in Its Tracks!, WORLDNETDAILY (Sept.
23, 2010, 9:05 PM), http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=207025
(participating pastors, hoping to spark an audit that could be used as a constitutional challenge
to the regulations, have sent their sermons that included specific voting suggestions to the IRS).
193 ADF Pulpit Freedom, supra note 191. The ADF initiative may account for the larger
number of candidates being endorsed during normal church services in the 2008 PACI summary
data. See 2010 Report, supra note 82, at 20 (reporting more than double the allegations of
church officials endorsing candidates during services in 2008 than in 2006 or 2004). .
194 Unruh, supra note 192.
195 As Kaplow puts it, when considering the category of individuals that will not become
informed under either a rule or under a standard:

Because individuals do not become informed under either formulation of the law,
information costs are not incurred. Moreover, uniformed individuals’ behavior does
not depend on whether a rule or standard prevails, so the benefits and harms of
individuals’ acts will be the same. Thus in the case, whether a rule or standard is
preferable will depend solely on the differences in promulgation and enforcement
costs.
Kaplow, supra note 18, at 572.
196 Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, 09–CV–670–IEG (AJB), 2009 WL 3320498, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 09–56926, 2011 WL 2452177 (9th Cir. June 21, 2011), cert.
denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012) (No. 11–511).
197 See, e.g., Guinane, supra note 15, at 143 (noting that the “current IRS enforcement
regime poses serious First Amendment problems for 501(c)(3) organizations”).
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Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,198 where Chief Justice Roberts wrote
that First Amendment standards “must give the benefit of any doubt
to protecting rather than stifling speech.”199 A recent article argues
that the vagueness of current IRS standards violates both the due
process clause and the First Amendment.200
Again, the question is not whether those that endorse these
constitutional arguments are right.201 From an administrator’s point of
view, what matters is whether those subject to a legal command
believe the constitutional arguments to be right in such a way as to
influence compliance and, in particular, interpretation of a standard.
The IRS itself recognizes that the campaign intervention
prohibition carries with it important First Amendment considerations.
The report on the 2004 PACI, for example, stated that one of the
challenges to enforcement and education was that “[t]he activities that
give rise to questions of political campaign intervention also raise
legitimate concerns regarding freedom of speech and religious
expression.”202 At the same time, it is generally the duty of
administrative agencies to execute the legal commands assigned to
them without consideration of the constitutionality of the legal
commands they enforce. “[A]djudication of the constitutionality of
congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies.”203
198 551

U.S. 449 (2007)
at 469 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964)).
200 See Bopp & Kester, supra note 15, at 75 (arguing that the unconstitutionally vague and
that the IRS’s enforcement violates procedural due process).
201 Of course, if those making the “void for vagueness” and “chilling of protected speech”
First Amendment arguments about the current standards are correct, the IRS will have no choice
but to write rules to carry out the campaign intervention prohibition.
202 2004 PACI Report, supra note 104, at 1.
203 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court went on to
observe, “[t]his rule is not mandatory, however . . . .” Id.; see also Harold J. Bruff, Specialized
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 361–62 (1991) (“True, agencies should
consider the constitutionality of their programs and procedures insofar as their statutes allow
change to meet constitutional objections.”); Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to
Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1682–83 n.1–3 (1977)
(citing many courts’, commentators’, and agencies’ assertions that agencies cannot pass on the
constitutionality of statutes that they enforce, but arguing that the “narrow excision on avowedly
constitutional grounds may actually further the overall legislative goals by saving the statute
from judicial revision or from being struck down altogether”). However, as Bernard Bell has
observed:
199 Id.

Some agencies have jurisdiction over issues which clearly implicate constitutional
concerns, and thus Congress clearly contemplates that they may have to address
constitutional principles. Congress could not be expected to address all such tensions
between policy goals and constitutional principles in advance. The Federal
Communications Commission is a prime example of such an agency.
Bernard W. Bell, Interpreting and Enacting Statues in the Constitution’s Shadows: An
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The issue on which this Article focuses is not adjudicating the
constitutionality of a statute, but promulgating administrative
directives in a way that best effects compliance. When a large
percentage of those running and advising affected organizations
believe that the First Amendment constrains the campaign
intervention prohibition, promulgating administrative guidance as
standards will likely decrease compliance. On one hand, a standard
without specific criteria allows affected parties to read it in terms of
their own norms, rather than those that the IRS assumes. For example,
when the IRS lists a variety of factors, affected organizations have a
normative basis for giving the most weight to factors in their favor.
On the other hand, organizations’ misunderstanding of standards may
prevent them from engaging in permitted activity.204
The beliefs of affected parties regarding underlying norms cannot
dictate administrative action. If that were the case, affected parties
could unduly influence the content of legal commands. Nonetheless,
administrators wishing to encourage compliance appropriately take
into account the norms of the regulated entities in deciding between
rules and standards. Given the First Amendment beliefs of many of
the parties affected by the campaign intervention prohibition,
standards will not accurately constrain behavior. Moreover, a number
of those affected by the legal command believe that underlying First
Amendment norms require the specificity of rules rather than the
uncertainty of standards. That the IRS itself recognizes the role of the
First Amendment also argues in favor of rules rather than standards.
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RULES
Thus far, consideration of the large number of affected parties, the
likelihood that many affected parties will not seek legal advice
regarding compliance, and the differing norms animating the
administrative agency administering the legal command and the
affected parties all suggest that the IRS should adopt rules rather than
standards to implement the campaign intervention prohibition.
Arguments against rules, however, cannot be ignored.
Kaplow addresses the frequent complaint against rules that they
are under- or overinclusive. They fail to cover some situations that the
legal command should encompass and may catch some that it should

Introduction, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 311 n.22 (2007).
204 See Guinane, supra note 15, at 152 (reporting that in one survey, 43 percent of those
501(c)(3) organizations surveyed incorrectly believed they could not host a candidate debate or
forum).
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not. Often, the complaint against rules takes the form of describing
rules as too simple. Standards, the argument goes, are more complex
in application because they inherently encompass more relevant
considerations. Thus, standards achieve a better fit with underlying
norms.205 Kaplow urges that considerations of simplicity versus
complexity be separated from considerations of ex ante versus ex post
that underlie the rules-standard distinction.206 Too often, he contends,
these categories are conflated and a simple rule is compared to a
complex standard. At the same time, however, he acknowledges:
When one makes a single pronouncement that will govern
many (perhaps millions) of cases, it is worthwhile to
undertake greater investigations into the relevance of
additional factors and to expend more effort fine-tuning the
weight accorded to each. Thus, when rules are to be
applicable to frequent behavior with recurring characteristics,
there is a systematic tendency for rule systems to be more
complex than the content that would actually be given to
standards covering the same activity.207
When rules are complex, learning their content imposes a cost on the
affected parties in ways that, in at least some cases, standards will not.
As David Weisbach has argued in partial rebuttal of Kaplow,
standards can allow the tax law to be simpler than a system of only
rules.208 Kaplow, like others, observes that it is difficult to draft rules
to cover uncommon situations.209 Weisbach argues that, in the case of
tax law, it is particularly important to tax uncommon transactions
appropriately because taxpayers will make them common as they
“discover how to take advantage of them.”210 Thus, infrequent
transactions must be addressed in the area of tax. To do so in rules,
however, may make the rules too complex, especially given
interaction among tax rules.211 Moreover, rules may often be
inaccurate at their borders, and thus complex rules will create
additional opportunities for tax avoidance. Standards, in contrast, do
not have to anticipate each and every situation, combination, or
permutation that might arise in the future. Weisbach thus concludes

205 See

Kaplow, supra note 18, at 589–90 (addressing this argument).
at 589.
207 Id. at 595.
208 David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 862 (1999).
209 See Kaplow, supra note 18, at 599 (“It would appear that some legal commands cannot
plausibly be formulated as rules.”).
210 Weisbach, supra note 208, at 869.
211 Id.
206 Id.
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that an anti-abuse rule might be appropriate to solve the intersection
of rules, standards, and complexity.212
The problematic situations that Weisbach identifies do not seem to
apply with great weight to the campaign intervention prohibition. It
interacts with few provisions. Any set of rules defining campaign
intervention would need to consider the impact of the limitation on
section 501(c)(3) organizations’ ability to lobby. That is, because
lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organizations is permitted to some
extent while political intervention is prohibited, it is important to
distinguish the two activities. Rules defining campaign intervention
will also need to coordinate with a definition of campaign
intervention for other organizations exempt under section 501(c) that
are permitted to engage in campaign intervention so long as it is not
their primary activity, such as 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations,
501(c)(5) labor organizations, and 501(c)(6) trade associations.
Finally, any definition of campaign intervention for purposes of
section 501(c) must also be coordinated with section 527, which
applies to political organizations, namely those organizations with a
primary purpose of campaign intervention.213 We need to consider all
definitions of political activity for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code. Defining campaign intervention is not, however, the kind of
scenario that Weisbach posits, in which a number of provisions can
shape a corporate or partnership transaction.
Nonetheless, a greater reliance on rules to give content to the
campaign intervention raises important concerns. The need to cover
all likely possibilities may produce a complex set of rules. A complex
set of rules, like a standard, may discourage those affected by the
rules, especially smaller organizations, from seeking legal advice.
Any set of rules is likely to be underinclusive to some extent, a state
of affairs that is likely to concern the IRS if it views the legislative
history of the prohibition as directing broad enforcement.
Sophisticated organizations and their advisors might be able to take
advantage of rules by staying within the letter of the rules while
violating their spirit with impunity. Any set of rules is likely to be
overinclusive in other regards, a state of affairs of great concern to
those members of the affected community who view the First
Amendment and the accompanying need not to chill protected speech
as an underlying norm for any regulation of speech.
There is also an argument that the uncertainty engendered by a set
of standards rather than rules will lead to greater compliance by the
212 Id.

at 879.
§ 527(e)(1) (2006).

213 I.R.C.
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affected community, a result that IRS might be expected to embrace.
Under a standard, such as the set of factors currently in use, the limits
of the campaign intervention prohibition are unclear. Risk adverse
charities will avoid any activity that might run afoul of the
prohibition. Thus, compliance with the prohibition will be achieved,
albeit at the cost of some overinclusion. A number of scholars have in
fact urged that tax administrators use strategic uncertainty, such as
strategically withholding guidance, as a tool for tax compliance.214
But as Leigh Osofsky explains, if taxpayers perceive the lack of
guidance as ambiguity regarding a tax outcome, “taxpayers with a
low chance of success on the merits would be more likely to claim the
tax benefits, whereas taxpayers with a high chance of success on the
merits would have the opposite inclination.”215
Thus, although developing a set of rules raises a number of
concerns regarding over- and underinclusiveness, the same concerns
arise with a standard. Some organizations would treat the standard as
overinclusive and others would see it as underinclusive, depending on
their appetite for risk. Aggressive taxpayers may become more
aggressive, and conservative taxpayers more conservative, in the
latter case, so much so that they fail to undertake permitted
activities.216
VII. WHAT SHOULD THE IRS DO?
Kaplow’s calculus urges that those deciding whether to undertake
the burdensome process of promulgating a rule consider both the
level of enforcement and the nature of the affected parties, in
particular whether and how they would go about understanding a
standard. The presence of many affected organizations unable to hire
expert advice regarding the political campaign intervention
prohibition argues for a rule. The low level of enforcement of the
political campaign intervention argues, at least at first look, for a
standard. But, as Kaplow suggests, if many are affected by the legal
command, a rule could be worthwhile even when enforcement is low.
Moreover, the likelihood that many of the regulated parties see norms
underlying the prohibition differently from the IRS suggests that use
of standards undermines compliance. All of these considerations lead
214 See Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV.
489, 489–90 n.4 (2011) (providing a list of such scholars).
215 Id. at 492.
216 See Guinane, supra note 15, at 152 (reporting that in one survey, 43 percent of those
501(c)(3) organizations surveyed incorrectly believed they could not host a candidate debate or
forum); cf. supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (discussing Korobkin’s comparison of
weight of risk aversion and self-serving bias.)
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to the conclusion that the IRS should promulgate more rules in
connection with the campaign intervention prohibition.
Considerations regarding the potential complexity and the potential
for both under- and overinclusiveness, however, raise the question of
whether a thorough rule-based regime or something less than that
would be more desirable.
One way “of obtaining the benefits of rules without some of the
costs” is to make use of standards with safe harbors.217 In 2005, I
drafted and sent to the IRS and the Treasury a set of four possible safe
harbors.218 One of the suggested safe harbors, for example, would
have protected remarks by a speaker, whether or not an official of the
organization, whose remarks included the statement that the speaker
is speaking only for him or herself and not telling the audience how to
vote.219 Such a safe harbor would have overturned current IRS
policy220 and have provided an easy, perhaps too easy, means for
permitting many communications currently forbidden under existing
guidance.
The analysis undertaken in this Article, however, leads to the
conclusion that promulgating a more robust set of rules is appropriate
because it would lead to the greatest possible compliance with the
law. Revenue Ruling 2007–41, for example, demonstrates that there
is a manageable set of categories in which political campaign
intervention is most likely to arise.221 At the same time, the findings
of the PACI over several election cycles show that there is a limited
number of recurring types of violation. For all these reasons, I
endorse an effort to go beyond framing a few safe harbors to urging
development of a set of rules. Such rules could include safe harbors at
various points, but I recommend a comprehensive effort to develop a
fuller set of rules.222
217 See Weisbach, supra note 208, at 876–877 (discussing a “safe-harbor” approach as one
that obtains “the benefits of rules without some of the costs”).
218 Ellen Aprill, Loyola Professor Proposes Safe Harbors for Political Campaign Activity
by 501(c)(3) Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 2, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 231–19.
Gregory Colvin also, at one time, suggested a safe harbor; see also Lee Mason, OMB Watch
Seeks Bright-Line Definition of Prohibited Political Activity by Charities, TAX NOTES TODAY,
June 4, 2009, available at LEXIS, 2009 TNT 105–20 (discussing and reprinting the suggestions
of Gregory Colvin).
219 Aprill, supra note 218.
220 See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 181, at 364 (noting that a disclaimer that
communication is made in speaker’s individual capacity is “insufficient to avoid attribution of
the endorsement to the organization,” when endorsement made in organization’s publication or
at official function).
221 See Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–25 I.R.B. 1421 (listing several categories that raise the
potential for political campaign intervention).
222 To support its suggestion that the prohibition be repealed or circumscribed, the Senate
Staff Memorandum states that the current IRS facts and circumstances test is difficult to
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One commentator has called upon the IRS and the Treasury to
model a set of rules after the regulations regarding 501(c)(3)
organizations’ election to adopt an expenditure limit for lobbying
activities under sections 501(h) and 491l.223 Gregory Colvin has
undertaken the first iteration of such an effort.224 According to Colvin,
“[a]lthough the charitable lobbying regulations are lengthy, the
interpretive detail and examples aid in sharply drawing the basic
definitions and in sharply drawing a few safe harbor exceptions.”225
Moreover, they have “generated practically zero controversy” and
various groups “provide handbooks and seminars to teach charities
what they can and can’t do, with or without help from lawyers, to
influence legislation.”226
I would urge some caution in relying on these regulations. For all
their supposed success, very few section 501(c)(3) organizations
choose to be subject to this elective regime, probably no more than 1
to 2 percent. It is difficult to know why such is the case. It may derive
from their length or their complexity. It might also be traced to the
fact that the most any organization can spend on lobbying under the
elective regime is $1 million.227 Nonetheless, this low level of
adoption must give us pause in calling the regulations successful (and
I speak as one who spent many hours working on these regulations as
a staffer in Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy). If the complexity of the
applicable set of rules is discouraging the adoption of the lobbying
expenditure election, that reaction cautions against adopting a
complex set of rules to define campaign intervention.
Previously in this Article, I have discussed First Amendment
norms without accepting their validity. Should the IRS devote the
considerable energies that developing a set of rules requires, prudence
dictates that those writing the rules take heed of First Amendment
concerns and the extent to which First Amendment standards
developed in other areas of the law, particularly federal election law,

administer, but does not consider the possibility of the IRS and the Treasury developing a set of
more specific rules. Senate Staff Memorandum, supra note 36, at 55.
223 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h) (1990); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911 (as amended in 2009). See also
Guinane, supra note 15, at 170 (discussing a set of rules regarding the political campaign
intervention prohibition modeled after those regulations).
224 Gregory L. Colvin, Political Tax Law After Citizens United: A Time for Reform, 66
EXEPT ORG. TAX REV. 71 (2010).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–1(c)(1)(i) (providing a sliding scale that sets lobbying
expenditure limits under the elective regime; an organization with a budget of $17 million or
more is subject to the $1 million ceiling).

2/13/2012 4:26:38 PM

682

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

may apply to the campaign intervention prohibition.228 Thus, in
drafting a set of rules for the political campaign intervention, the
Treasury and the IRS will face a difficult task in deciding how much
to import First Amendment considerations developed in other areas of
law. This difficult task compounds further the difficulties inherent in
developing a coherent, easily applicable set of rules. However, the
consequences of reliance on standards in this area, even apart from
constitutional concerns, call upon them to do so.229
CONCLUSION
Critiques of the IRS approach to regulating the campaign activities
of section 501(c)(3) organizations, like many other critiques of the
IRS, generally take the point of view of the regulated entities to point
out the defects in the IRS approach, in particular the difficulties
taxpayers can face in complying with standards. In the case of the
campaign intervention prohibition, the critique of current IRS
standards in this area draws heavily on First Amendment
jurisprudence, a more unusual approach for those taking the IRS to
task. This Article has approached the problem from another point of
view. It attempts to address the issue from the agency’s point of view,
balancing its responsibility to encourage compliance and accurately
identify offenders. To do so, this Article has applied Kaplow’s Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, which makes no
assumptions about the inherent superiority of a rule or a standard.
Application of the considerations identified by Kaplow—the low
level of enforcement, the large number of affected parties, and the
number of affected parties unlikely to seek legal advice—strongly
suggests that rules will better regulate this area than standards, at least
when the topic of regulations affects both large and small section
501(c)(3) organizations.230 Other considerations, such as how affected
228 See Aprill, supra note 36, at 69–81 (discussing the effect of election law jurisprudence
on nonprofit organizations); Miriam Galston, When Statutory Rights Collide: Will Citizens
United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity
Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CON. L. 867, 871 (2011) (noting that recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has called into question the IRS’s regulation of campaign intervention of
nonprofit organizations). Adopting a similar view, the Senate Staff Memorandum suggests that
“participate” or “intervene” be interpreted consistently with the federal election law. Senate
Staff Memorandum, supra note 36, at 61.
229 The possibility of legislative change, as recommended by the Senate Staff
Memorandum, supra note 36, at 54, could give the IRS and the Treasury pause in undertaking
such a regulation project. I believe that legislative change is unlikely and that regulatory change
such as those discussed here could reduce its likelihood further.
230 That is, different considerations apply to the question of rules versus standards if the
regulation is of areas likely to affect only those section 501(c)(3)’s with access to tax advisors,
such as hospitals or private foundations.
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parties may interpret standards and constitutional considerations that
surround the prohibition, reinforce this conclusion. The IRS should
undertake the difficult work of writing a set of rules for the campaign
intervention prohibition.

